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ARTICLE
REINVIGORATING THE FEDERAL PARDON
PROCESS: WHAT THE PRESIDENT CAN
LEARN FROM THE STATES
MARGARET COLGATE LOVE*
ABSTRACT
In the past thirty years the president has been increasingly reluctant to
use his constitutional power to pardon, although the demand for pardon
has also increased, to restore rights and shorten sentences. The primary
reason is that the process for the administration of the power has lost its
vigor, its integrity, and its sense of purpose. The attorney general, steward
of the power since the Civil War, has allowed a parochial institutional
agenda to inform pardon recommendations instead of broadly defined pres-
idential policy goals. The three most recent presidents have been willing to
live with a dysfunctional pardon process, evidently because they did not
regard pardoning as a duty of office and perceived its risks to outweigh its
rewards. Without a plan for using the power, and without a reliable system
for executing it, pardoning has become a dangerous activity for any presi-
dent, and a useless vestigial appendage of the presidency. The failure of the
pardon process during the 1990s explains why President Clinton’s final
days in office were marred by pardon-related scandal, a fate only narrowly
averted by his successor, George W. Bush. It appears that President Obama
believes he can avoid scandal by not pardoning at all, or by making only
token use of the power.
State pardon procedures suggest ways that presidential pardoning
could be restored to a useful place in the federal justice system. While
states follow a variety of different administrative models, most have proce-
dures that are more transparent, accountable, and authoritative than the
federal process. Some states mandate consultation with elected or ap-
pointed boards, some require pre-pardon publication of applications or in-
* Law Office of Margaret Love. Former U.S. Pardon Attorney (1990–1997). Thanks to
Jeffrey Crouch for helpful comments on an earlier version of this Article. I am particularly grate-
ful to T.J. Lang for his assistance in preparing the pardon chart at the end of this article and to
Evan Everist for his patience and editing skill.
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tended executive action, and some require public hearings and consultation
with responsible justice officials. In thirty-two of the forty-four states where
the governor is responsible for pardoning, the state constitution requires an
annual report to the legislature on pardon grants for that year. Experience
in the states that have a sound administrative structure suggests that even if
a reliable process does not guarantee vigorous pardoning, it at least dis-
courages the sort of irresponsible use (or disuse) of the power that has
become the norm in the federal system.
Three reforms could reinvigorate the federal pardon process and re-
store its moral force. First, the process should be guided by clear standards
that are applied consistently, and grants should be reasoned and defensible.
Second, the process must be administered by individuals who are indepen-
dent and authoritative, who have the confidence of the president, and who
are given the necessary resources to carry out the president’s pardoning
agenda. Third, the process must be accessible and responsive to people of
all walks of life, and take into account the likelihood that many deserving
pardon applicants will not have skilled counsel or well-connected support-
ers to advocate on their behalf.
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INTRODUCTION
Pardon has fallen into disuse in the American criminal justice system
and yet there has never been a greater need for it. A power to pardon was
included in the federal Constitution because its framers understood that leg-
islative punishments tend to be harsh and courts strict about imposing them,
so that there must be some power in the executive to make “exceptions in
favor of unfortunate guilt” lest justice “wear a countenance too sanguinary
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and cruel.”1 From the earliest years of our nation’s history, the power to
pardon was used routinely by the president, as it was by state governors
under their own constitutions, to correct unjust or unpopular results of a
legal system whose procedural protections were crude and punishments
harsh, supplementing (or curbing) the power of other actors in the justice
system.2 For a time during the middle of the twentieth century, it seemed
that pardon had “outlived its usefulness” because of better procedural pro-
tections for the criminally charged and flexible alternative early release
mechanisms like parole.3 By that time, most states had dismantled the old
apparatus of civil death in favor of a new emphasis on rehabilitation and
restoration of rights.4 With the abolition of federal parole in 1984 and the
growth of a punitive regime of collateral consequences, some predicted that
pardon would reclaim a useful role as an instrument of justice.5 That this
has not happened is largely because of the way the pardon power is pres-
ently administered by the Justice Department.
As originally conceived by Lincoln’s Attorney General, Edward Bates,
during the Civil War, the federal pardon process was intended to protect the
president from his own generous impulses and the power of his office from
those with special access. As elaborated by Bates’ successors to meet opera-
tional needs of the federal justice system, the federal pardon process served
1. THE FEDERALIST NO. 74, at 447 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961)
(Hamilton also justified giving the president exclusive control of the “benign prerogative of par-
doning” for reasons of statecraft, to defuse a politically inflammatory situation.). See also Douglas
Hay, Property, Authority and the Criminal Law, in ALBION’S FATAL TREE: CRIME AND SOCIETY IN
18TH CENTURY ENGLAND 44 (Douglas Hay et al. eds., 1975) (describing how pardon in eight-
eenth-century England “moderated the barbarity of the criminal law in the interests of humanity. It
was erratic and capricious, but a useful palliative until Parliament reformed the law in the nine-
teenth century.”). For a recent exegesis of the thinking of the framers about the pardon power, see
Paul Rosenzweig, Reflections on the Atrophying Pardon Power, 102 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY
593, 595–603 (2012).
2. See W.H. HUMBERT, THE PARDONING POWER OF THE PRESIDENT 95–133 (1941) (describ-
ing the Justice Department’s administration of the pardon power through the administration of
Franklin Roosevelt (1860–1936)); Margaret Colgate Love, The Twilight of the Pardon Power, 100
J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1169, 1175–93 (2010) (describing the administration of the presi-
dent’s pardon power from the earliest years of the Republic through 1980). The president’s inter-
vention to ameliorate harsh sentencing laws at the request of judges in the earliest years of the
Republic is described in George Lardner, Jr. & Margaret Colgate Love, Mandatory Sentences and
Presidential Mercy: The Role of Judges in Pardon Cases, 1790–1850, 16 FED. SENT’G REP. 212
(2004).
3. See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, 3 THE ATTORNEY GENERAL’S SURVEY OF RELEASE PROCE-
DURES: PARDON 296 (1939) [hereinafter ATTORNEY GENERAL’S SURVEY]. See also KATHLEEN
DEAN MOORE, PARDONS: JUSTICE, MERCY, AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST 84 (1989) (noting that the
prevalent view was that “the time [has come] for ‘pardons silently to fade away—like collar
buttons, their usefulness at an end’”).
4. Gabriel J. Chin, The New Civil Death: Rethinking Punishment in the Era of Mass Convic-
tion, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 1789, 1793–1803 (2012).
5. See MOORE, supra note 3, at 86 (speculating that the abolition of federal parole could
lead to “an expanded and crucial role for pardon”).
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both objectives because it was transparent, authoritative, and accountable.6
But federal pardoning lost its transparency under Franklin Roosevelt, its
authority under Ronald Reagan, and its accountability under Bill Clinton,
setting the stage for an end-of-term scramble for mercy that “disgusted”
George W. Bush and engulfed Bill Clinton in scandal.7 Unrepaired and ne-
glected by President Obama, and evidently “drained of its moral force,”8
the federal pardon process began to generate mini-scandals of its own.9 Per-
haps as a result, by the end of his first term President Obama had pardoned
less generously than any president since John Adams.10
A new administrative paradigm must be developed if President Obama
is to use his constitutional power with the courage and capacity the framers
intended. Useful models for a restructured and reinvigorated federal pardon
process can be found in the states, which have experimented with various
arrangements for managing their own pardon power that are conducive to
transparency, authority, and accountability.11 While a sound administrative
structure does not guarantee vigorous pardoning, at least it discourages the
6. See Love, supra note 2, at 1172–93, for an overview of presidential pardoning from 1789
until 1980. See also P.S. Ruckman, Jr., Federal Executive Clemency in the United States,
1789–1995, Paper presented at the annual meeting of the Southern Political Science Association:
Tampa, Florida (November 1995), available at http://pardonresearch.com/papers/4.pdf (providing
an overview of presidential pardoning from 1789 to 1995).
7. See GEORGE W. BUSH, DECISION POINTS 104 (2010) (“One of the biggest surprises of my
presidency was the flood of pardon requests at the end. I could not believe the number of people
who pulled me aside to suggest that a friend or former colleague deserved a pardon. At first I was
frustrated. Then I was disgusted. I came to see the massive injustice in the system. If you had
connections to the president, you could insert your case into the last-minute frenzy.”). See also
Margaret Colgate Love, The Pardon Paradox: Lessons from Clinton’s Last Pardons, 31 CAP. U.
L. REV. 185, 196 n.38 (2003) [hereinafter Paradox] (describing the breakdown of the federal
pardon process at the end of the Clinton presidency).
8. Anthony M. Kennedy, Associate Justice, U.S. Supreme Court, Speech at the American
Bar Association (Aug. 9, 2003), in 16 FED. SENT’G REP. 126, 128 (2003) (“The pardon process, of
late, seems to have been drained of its moral force. Pardons have become infrequent. A people
confident in its laws and institutions should not be ashamed of mercy.”).
9. See infra Part II. See, e.g., Dafna Linzer, IG Criticizes Justice Pardon Attorney over His
Handling of Inmate’s Plea for Release, WASH. POST, Dec. 18, 2012, http://www.washingtonpost.
com/politics/ig-criticizes-justice-pardon-attorney-over-his-handling-of-inmates-plea-for-release/
2012/12/18/a6440c6a-495d-11e2-820e-17eefac2f939_story.html (describing one scandal regard-
ing Pardon Attorney Ronald L. Rodgers’ handling of a pardon denied at the end of President
George W. Bush’s administration).
10. P.S. Ruckman, Jr., SHOCK: Obama’s Pardon Disaster. The Merciless Term, PARDON
POWER (Jan. 20, 2013), http://www.pardonpower.com/2013/01/shock-obamas-pardon-disaster-
merciless.html (containing data collected by P.S. Ruckman, Jr. from copies of State Department
clemency warrants found on Microfilm Set T969, National Archives, the Annual Report of the
U.S. Attorney General and a CD set of clemency warrants issued by the Office of the Pardon
Attorney, U.S. Department of Justice). As of January 20, 2013, President Obama had pardoned
twenty-two people, commuted one sentence, and denied 4,812 petitions. The president closest to
his record in modern times was George W. Bush, who by the end of his first term had issued
twenty-nine pardons, commuted two sentences, and denied 3,595 petitions. Clemency Statistics,
U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, http://www.justice.gov/pardon/statistics.htm (last visited Jan. 25, 2013).
11. A chart summarizing pardoning practices and frequency of grants in each U.S. jurisdic-
tion is appended to this article. For more detailed state-by-state summaries of pardoning policy
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sort of irresponsible use (or disuse) of the power that has marred the federal
experience in the three most recent presidencies.
Part I of this article explains how the process for administering the
presidential pardon power has lost both its vigor and its integrity, frustrating
the power’s responsible exercise. Part II describes the transparency, author-
ity, and accountability features that encourage responsible pardoning in
many of the states. Part III makes specific recommendations for restoring
integrity and vigor to the federal pardon process.
I. THE LEAST RESPECTED POWER
Pardon is the least respected and most misunderstood of presidential
powers. The public associates pardoning with holiday gift-giving and end-
of-term scandals,12 and periodic pardon-related controversies seem to con-
firm this skepticism.13 A pardon seems to most people like a winning lot-
tery ticket or a lightning strike, not something one can earn or deserve like
other benefits in a democracy. Scholars treat pardon as a constitutional
anomaly, a remnant of tribal kingship that is not part of the checks-and-
balances package.14 Practitioners rarely account for pardon in discussions
and practice, see Margaret Colgate Love, Restoration of Rights Project, NACDL, www.nacdl.org/
rightsrestoration (last visited Jan. 25, 2013).
12. Sixty years ago, when pardoning was far more frequent, the introduction to a study of the
federal pardon power noted that “the vast majority of people have a very hazy idea of the meaning
and of the implications of the President’s pardoning power. The persistence of erroneous ideas,
the lack of exact information, and the absence of publicity concerning the acts of the pardoning
authority envelop the power in a veil of mystery.” HUMBERT, supra note 2, at 5–6.
13. In January 2012, Mississippi Governor Haley Barbour granted clemency to 222 individu-
als, some, but apparently not all of whom had applied for pardon through the established proce-
dure. Himanshu Ojha, Marcus Stern & Robbie Ward, Insight: Mississippi Pardons Benefited
Whites by Big Margin, REUTERS, Jan. 20, 2012, http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/01/20/us-usa-
mississippi-pardons-idUSTRE80J25K20120120. See also In re Hooker, 87 So. 3d 401 (Miss.
2012) (upholding the validity of pardons whose beneficiaries had failed to comply with the notice
requirement in the Mississippi Constitution).
14. The legal scholars who have written about the pardon power can be counted on the
fingers of one hand, and constitutional texts mention it only as an afterthought. See, e.g., AKHIL
REED AMAR, AMERICA’S CONSTITUTION: A BIOGRAPHY 61, 131, 179, 187, 189, 226, 239, 316
(2012) (referencing without discussion the president’s pardon power on eight of 672 pages of
text); PETER M. SHANE & HAROLD H. BRUFF, THE LAW OF PRESIDENTIAL POWER 439–43 (1988)
(referencing the pardon power on five of 811 pages of text). See also Daniel T. Kobil, The Quality
of Mercy Strained: Wresting the Pardoning Power from the King, 69 TEX. L. REV. 569, 604, 611
(1991) (explaining that the clemency power has been “trivialized,” having “failed to evolve with
the rest of the judicial system”).
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about doing justice,15 notwithstanding the occasional hat-tip from the Su-
preme Court.16
Few know that for the first 180 years of our nation’s history presidents
made liberal and regular use of their constitutional power, as governors did
in the states.17 Indeed, the earliest presidents pardoned routinely, sometimes
at the request of federal judges and prosecutors, to correct unjust or unpopu-
lar results of a legal system that had few built-in correctives.18 Before there
was a federal prison system and the possibility of early release on parole,
when prison sentences were mandatory and served in squalid county jails,
hundreds of federal prisoners were freed by presidential fiat every year.19
When conviction of a felony resulted in civil death in many states, full
pardons restored repentant federal criminals to their rights and status.20
From time to time, the president was criticized for granting particular par-
dons, but the ordinary business of pardoning went on month after month,
year after year, out of the public eye and without fanfare or controversy,
until the 1980s.21 What Alexander Hamilton called the “benign preroga-
tive” also played a critical role in resolving political crises, from the Whis-
15. Capital cases are a significant exception, where clemency has continued to play an im-
portant role. See Clemency, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CENTER (2012), http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.
org/clemency (comprehensive listing of clemency grants in capital cases since the reinstatement of
the death penalty in 1976).
16. See, e.g., Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 411–12 (1993) (“Clemency is deeply rooted
in our Anglo-American tradition of law, and is the historic remedy for preventing miscarriages of
justice where judicial process has been exhausted.”).
17. ATTORNEY GENERAL’S SURVEY, supra note 3, at 44–52, 155–85 (describing the role of
pardon in the American colonies, and the regularization of pardoning procedures in the late nine-
teenth century); U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, 4 THE ATTORNEY GENERAL’S SURVEY OF RELEASE PRO-
CEDURES: PAROLE 41–54 (1939) (describing evolution of parole from pardon in the early twentieth
century). Parole apparently was originally introduced in some states not for any new interest in
encouraging rehabilitation, but for a simple desire to relieve administrative burdens on the gover-
nor. See, e.g., Sheldon L. Messinger et al., The Foundations of Parole in California, 19 LAW &
SOC’Y REV. 69, 69 (1985) (“Parole was introduced in California, and used for over a decade,
primarily to relieve governors of part of the burden of exercising clemency to reduce the excessive
sentences of selected state prisoners.”).
18. George Lardner, Jr. & Margaret Colgate Love, Mandatory Sentences and Presidential
Mercy: The Role of Judges in Pardon Cases, 1790–1850, 16 FED. SENT’G REP. 1, 1–2 (2004).
19. See P.S. Ruckman, Jr., Presidential Pardons/Commutations by Term, 1789–2009,
PARDONRESEARCH.COM, http://pardonresearch.com/prescomp/pardcommTerm.htm (last visited
Jan. 25, 2013) (providing a graph displaying the number of pardons by each president). See also
Love, supra note 2, at 1175–87 (describing the early process for granting pardons).
20. See HUMBERT, supra note 2, at 100–01 (noting an increase of pardons “to restore civil
rights” after 1895).
21. See Samuel T. Morison, The Politics of Grace: On the Moral Justification of Executive
Clemency, 9 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 1, 2 (2005) (“For most of this country’s history, the practice of
executive clemency has quietly functioned as an ancillary feature of the criminal justice system,
without attracting much attention or generating much controversy in the vast majority of cases.”).
\\jciprod01\productn\U\UST\9-3\UST305.txt unknown Seq: 7 10-MAY-13 13:19
736 UNIVERSITY OF ST. THOMAS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 9:3
key Rebellion to the Vietnam War and even President Nixon’s
resignation.22
Pardon played a constructive and varied role in the federal justice sys-
tem largely because of the attorney general’s central role in administering
the power.23 Lincoln’s Attorney General, Edward Bates, was the first to see
the institutional advantages of controlling access to the president and har-
nessing the pardon power to the needs of the justice system.24 Before that
time, pardoning took place on an ad hoc basis, either because some official
recommended it or because some interested party had personal access to the
president.25 Lincoln’s inclination to be merciful and his sensitivity to par-
don’s symbolic value were the sources of some frustration to his generals,
though his pardoning apparently inspired the troops.26 White House Secre-
tary John Hay reported that the president spent long hours reviewing clem-
ency requests from soldiers and their families and famously entertained
pardon petitioners at the White House.27 This was all too much for Lin-
coln’s rather stern attorney general, who opined that his chief was “unfit to
be trusted with the pardoning power” because he was too susceptible to
women’s tears.28 Convinced that discipline and regularity needed to be
brought to pardoning, Bates persuaded Lincoln that pardon petitions should
be submitted first to him. Edmund Stedman, the Attorney General’s per-
sonal secretary, was given the job of managing the flow of pardon petitions
and the title of “clerk of pardons.”  Stedman later recalled that “I soon dis-
covered that my most important duty was to keep all but the most deserving
22. THE FEDERALIST NO. 74, supra note 1, at 446. The pardon power was used as a tool of
statecraft to “restore the tranquility of the commonwealth.” Id. at 449. See JEFFREY CROUCH, THE
PRESIDENTIAL PARDON POWER 53–85 (2009); Love, supra note 2, at 1173–75.
23. See Love, supra note 2, at 1175–95 (describing the administration of the president’s
pardon power from the earliest years of the Republic through 1980); HUMBERT, supra note 2, at
95–136 (describing the Justice Department’s administration of the pardon power through the Ad-
ministration of Franklin Roosevelt).
24. Bates declared that President Lincoln was “unfit to be trusted with the pardoning power”
because he was too susceptible to women’s tears. RICHARD N. CURRENT, THE LINCOLN NOBODY
KNOWS 169 (1958). Pardon Clerk Edmund Stedman reported, “My chief, Attorney General Bates,
soon discovered that my most important duty was to keep all but the most deserving cases from
coming before the kind Mr. Lincoln at all; since there was nothing harder for him to do than put
aside a prisoner’s application . . . .”  J. T. Dorris, President Lincoln’s Clemency, 20 J. ILL. ST.
HIST. SOC’Y 547, 550 (1953) (citing 1 LAURA STEDMAN & GEORGE M. GOULD, LIFE AND LETTERS
OF EDMUND CLARENCE STEDMAN 265 (1910)).
25. See Love, supra note 2, at 1175–78 (describing the administration of the pardon power
before 1870).
26. Dorris, supra note 24, at 553.
27. See INSIDE LINCOLN’S WHITE HOUSE: THE COMPLETE CIVIL WAR DIARY OF JOHN HAY
64 (Michael Burlingame & John R. Turner eds., 1997) (describing a six-hour session in which
Lincoln eagerly “caught at any fact which would justify him in saving the life of a condemned
soldier”).
28. CURRENT, supra note 24, at 169. People joked that enterprising merchants in the District
of Columbia rented weeping children and widow’s weeds to the mothers of condemned soldiers
before their audiences with the President. WILLIAM E. BARTON, THE LIFE OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN
255 (1925).
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cases from coming before the kind Mr. Lincoln at all, since there was noth-
ing harder for him to do than put aside a prisoner’s application . . . .”29 If a
regime based on personal influence made it too hard for the president to say
no, it also made it too easy for individuals with a personal or political
agenda to adversely affect the more accountable functions of government.
Thus began the president’s practice of referring all pardon petitions to
the attorney general for investigation and recommendation. It soon became
apparent that this practice made sense not only to avoid compromising the
president or wasting his time, but also to ensure that the pardon power
would function as an efficient adjunct to the justice system. After the estab-
lishment of the Justice Department in 1870, the attorney general also be-
came responsible for the proper care of federal prisoners, then mostly
housed in state facilities, and he made it a priority to ensure their access to
the clemency process.30 In 1893, President Cleveland formally transferred
all administrative duties in pardon matters from the secretary of state to the
attorney general,31 who in turn delegated this responsibility to a department
official known thenceforth as the pardon attorney. In 1898, the first clem-
ency regulations jointly signed by President McKinley and Attorney Gen-
eral John Griggs formalized a system whereby all seekers of a presidential
pardon were required to call at the Justice Department rather than at the
White House.32
In this fashion, the president’s constitutional power became part and
parcel of the more general transformation of the federal justice system to a
centralized administrative state.33 And because the pardon power was ad-
29. Dorris, supra note 24, at 550. Edmund Clarence Stedman (1833–1908) is primarily re-
nowned for his later contributions to poetry and literary criticism. In 1904, Stedman was one of
the first seven chosen for membership in the American Academy of Arts and Letters. In addition
to his literary achievements, Stedman pursued scientific and technical endeavors, and his design
for an airship inspired by the anatomy of a fish foreshadowed the dirigibles of the early twentieth
century. See ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITTANICA 861 (Hugh Chisholm ed., 11th ed., 1911) (entry on the
life of Edmund Clarence Stedman).
30. The Annual Report of the Attorney General for 1880–1881 describes a system of regular
inspections of state and local prisons and jails where federal prisoners were housed, through which
deserving cases of “sick and friendless prisoners who might otherwise have no means of commu-
nicating with the pardoning power” would be “[brought], through this department, to the attention
of the President” for consideration of clemency. 1880–1881 ATT’Y GEN. ANN. REP. 20. See Love,
supra note 2, at 1178–87 (describing the system for handling pardons between 1870 and 1930).
31. See Exec. Order of June 16, 1893 (on file with author). See also Reed Cozart, Clemency
under the Federal System, 13 FED. PROBATION 3, 3 n.1 (1959).
32. See Rules Relating to Applications for Pardon, 1, 3, 4 (Feb. 3, 1898) [hereinafter 1898
Clemency Rules] (containing rules signed by President William McKinley and Attorney General
John Griggs). A complete set of clemency regulations, from the 1898 McKinley regulations to the
current regulations approved by President Clinton in 1993, is on file with the author.
33. See Love, supra note 2, at 1179 (“The administrative system formalized after the Depart-
ment of Justice was established in 1870 made the unruly power part of the more general transfor-
mation of the justice system to an administrative state, steering most clemency suitors away from
the president’s door for over 100 years.”). See also HUMBERT, supra note 2, at 82–94 (describing
its operation between 1870 and 1940); Morison, supra note 21, at 28–47 (describing the operation
of the federal pardon process in recent years).
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ministered and to some extent controlled by the Justice Department, its ex-
ercise necessarily reflected the values and policy preferences of those
responsible for prosecuting crime and administering punishment.34 At the
same time, the advisory role of a member of the president’s cabinet ensured
that political as well as law enforcement considerations would dictate par-
don’s role in the justice system, and that it would operate with authority.
Each year, between 1885 and 1932, the annual report of the attorney general
detailed (sometimes extensively) his reasons for recommending each of the
hundreds of annual clemency grants, providing an unparalleled basis for
holding publicly accountable an otherwise unrestrained power of
government.35
Until quite recently this administrative system did what it was de-
signed to do. While over the years there have been controversial grants,
there were no genuine pardon-related scandals in the federal system until
the process broke down in the Clinton Administration. The story of that
breakdown has been told elsewhere, but suffice it to say that the Clinton
Justice Department failed to develop a responsible pardoning policy or edu-
cate President Clinton on his pardoning responsibilities, ignored his re-
quests at the end of his term for more favorable pardon recommendations,
and stood by while the president indulged in an unprecedented orgy of final
pardoning that scandalized the nation.36
34. This means that the president did not always take the rather stern advice that came to him
from the Justice Department. For example, in 1932, Attorney General William Mitchell com-
mented in a speech to the American Bar Association on the tension that sometimes arose between
Justice Department prosecutors, determined to enforce the criminal laws severely, and President
Hoover, a veteran practitioner of humanitarian relief:
Reviewing the past three years, I believe that it is in respect to pardons that President
Hoover has most often shown an inclination to disagree with the Department of Justice.
I suspect he thinks we are too rigid. The pitiful result of criminal misconduct is that the
burden of misery falls most heavily on the women and children. If executive clemency
were granted in all cases of suffering families, the result would be a general jail deliv-
ery, so we have to steel ourselves against such appeals. President Hoover, with a human
sympathy born of his great experiences in the relief of human misery, has now and
again, not for great malefactors but for humble persons in cases you never heard of,
been inclined to disagree with the prosecutor’s viewpoint and extend mercy. We have
been glad when such incidents occurred.
HUMBERT, supra note 2, at 121 (quoting Attorney General William D. Mitchell, Address at An-
nual American Bar Association: Reform in Criminal Procedure (Oct. 13, 1932)).
35. See Love, supra note 2, at 1180 n.43, 1191.
36. See The Controversial Pardon of International Fugitive Marc Rich: Hearings before the
H. Comm. on Government Reform, 107th Cong., 1st Sess. 342–43 (2001) [hereinafter The Contro-
versial Pardon of International Fugitive Marc Rich] (containing testimony of Beth Nolan, Coun-
sel to former President Clinton, describing the unresponsive Justice Department pardon process at
the conclusion of the Clinton Administration, and the ensuing frantic effort at the White House in
the final weeks to process the hundreds of clemency requests coming directly to the White
House). See also Love, supra note 7, at 188–202 (describing run-up to final Clinton pardons, the
failure of the Justice Department pardon process, staffing of pardons in the White House, and the
grants themselves). For a colorful account by a member of the loyal opposition, including a repre-
sentative sampling of the extensive contemporary press coverage, see BARBARA OLSON, THE FI-
NAL DAYS 113–93 (2001).
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After the tidal wave of irregular grants on Clinton’s final day in office,
some urged that responsibility for administering the president’s power be
removed from the Justice Department,37 while others thought the Justice
Department process could be reformed.38 But the problems in the Justice
Department’s pardon process persisted into the presidency of George W.
Bush. Requests from the White House for more favorable recommendations
were once again ignored by the Justice Department,39 and once again White
House officials found themselves unable to count on support from the Jus-
tice Department when they were deluged with applications from well-con-
nected favor-seekers at the end of President Bush’s second term.40 In 2007,
the pardon attorney was forced to resign as a result of an internal investiga-
tion into mismanagement of the pardon program.41 Three years later, the
Justice Department’s Inspector General reported that the new pardon attor-
ney (a former military judge and narcotics prosecutor) was personally
processing and sending forward to the White House hundreds of recom-
37. See, e.g., Daniel T. Kobil, Reviving Presidential Clemency in Cases of “Unfortunate
Guilt”, 21 FED. SENT’G REP. 160, 163 (2009) (“Given the prosecutorial responsibilities of the
Justice Department, there is a conflict of interest present when its attorneys must also serve as the
gatekeepers for clemency.”); Evan P. Schultz, Does the Fox Control Pardons in the Henhouse?,
13 FED. SENT’G REP. 177, 177–78 (2001) (“[A]n organization with a vested interest in prosecuting
and convicting people is in charge of recommending whether those convictions should be put
aside . . . . The real solution is removal of the process from Justice.”).
38. See Brian M. Hoffstadt, Guarding the Integrity of the Clemency Power, 13 FED. SENT’G
REP. 180, 181–82 (2001) (discussing ways the clemency review process could remain within the
Justice Department without being unduly influenced by the perspective of prosecutors).
39. See Dafna Linzer & Jennifer LaFleur, ProPublica Review of Pardons in Past Decade
Shows Process Heavily Favored Whites, WASH. POST, Dec. 3, 2011, http://www.washingtonpost.
com/investigations/propublica-review-of-pardons-in-past-decade-shows-process-heavily-favored-
whites/2011/11/23/gIQAElnVQO_story.html:
In 2006, White House Counsel Harriet Miers became so frustrated with the paucity of
recommended candidates that she met with Adams and his boss, Deputy Attorney Gen-
eral Paul McNulty. Adams said he told Miers that if she wanted more recommendations,
he would need more staff. Adams said he did not get any extra help. Nothing changed.
“It became very frustrating, because we repeatedly asked the office for more favorable
recommendations for the president to consider,” said Fielding, who was Bush’s last
White House counsel. “But all we got were more recommendations for denials.”
40. See, e.g., Hearing before the H. Comm. on Government Reform on the Pardon of Marc
Rich, 107th Cong., 1st Sess. 316–437 (2001) (containing testimony of Beth Nolan, White House
Counsel during President Clinton’s final days in office); Love, supra note 7, at 198 n.41 (confirm-
ing that the Justice Department informed the White House in the fall of 2000 that “they couldn’t
take any more pardon applications and that they weren’t going to be able to review them or get the
information to the White House.” (internal quotations omitted)); Charlie Savage, On Clemency
Fast Track, Via Oval Office, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 1, 2009, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/01/01/
washington/01pardon.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0 (discussing pardon granted to Isaac Toussie
without a recommendation from the Justice Department that was later revoked after the White
House became aware of his controversial reputation in the community).
41. See George Lardner, Jr., Begging Bush’s Pardon, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 4, 2008, http://www.
nytimes.com/2008/02/04/opinion/04lardner.html (describing the backlog of clemency applications
in the Justice Department, and the charges that resulted in the pardon attorney Roger Adams’
resignation). A more recent scandal regarding racial disparity in pardon recipients and inmate
Clarence Aaron’s plea for release has involved his successor, Ronald L. Rogers. See Linzer, supra
note 9.
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mendations in commutation cases, assisted only by unpaid law-student in-
terns, establishing that most prisoner petitions were getting short shrift.42
The pardon process was described as a “bottomless black box” where appli-
cations lingered for years before finally being denied without explanation.43
In 2011, investigative reporting published in the Washington Post docu-
mented outcomes of pardon cases evidently disfavoring racial minorities,
undue influence by members of Congress in favor of wealthy constituents,44
and misleading advice to the White House in a case involving a prisoner
serving three life sentences for distributing crack cocaine.45 In the wake of
these revelations, the White House asked the Bureau of Justice Statistics to
report on how pardons were processed,46 members of Congress and advo-
cacy organizations called for an investigation of the pardon attorney’s of-
fice,47 and the Department’s Inspector General recommended that the
pardon attorney be disciplined.48 The New York Times editorialized how the
42. See AUDIT REPORT 11-45, OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., AUDIT OF THE DEPARTMENT
OF JUSTICE PROCESSING OF CLEMENCY RECOMMENDATIONS 31–32 (Sept. 2011) (providing that in
the past it took more time to process petitions but now that the pardon attorney has gained more
staff, including law students, the turnaround time on these petitions has gone down).
43. See Molly Gill, Into the Bottomless Black Box: The Prisoner’s Perspective on the Com-
mutation Process, 20 FED. SENT’G REP. 16, 16 (2007) (“The process is a black box because it
gives applicants no meaningful guidance and few updates as their applications are reviewed by the
Office of the Pardon Attorney and the Deputy Attorney General and granted or denied by the
president.”). The federal pardon process is described in detail in Morison, supra note 21, at 35–46.
44. See Dafna Linzer, Presidential Pardons: A Lawmaker’s Support Improves Criminals’
Odds for Mercy, WASH. POST, Dec. 4, 2011, http://www.washingtonpost.com/investigations/presi-
dential-pardons-a-lawmakers-support-improves-criminals-odds-for-mercy/2011/11/23/gIQA61bV
UO_story.html.
45. See Dafna Linzer, Clarence Aaron Was Denied Commutation, but Bush Team Wasn’t
Told All the Facts, WASH. POST, May 3, 2012, http://www.washingtonpost.com/investigations/
clarence-aaron-was-denied-commutation-but-bush-team-wasnt-told-all-the-facts/2012/05/13/gIQ
AEZLRNU_story.html. See also Dafna Linzer, Obama Administration Seeks New Review of Com-
mutation Request from Clarence Aaron, WASH. POST, July 18, 2012, http://www.washingtonpost.
com/politics/obama-seeks-fresh-review-of-federal-prisoners-commutation-request/2012/07/18/gJ
QApDm6tW_story.html (recounting the story of Clarence Aaron discussing President Obama’s
approach to pardoning).
46. The Department of Justice inquiry is intended to test the conclusion of the investigative
series described in notes 39 and 60 that whites are favored in the pardon process. See Dafna
Linzer, Details Emerge on Government Study of Presidential Pardons, PROPUBLICA (Aug. 8,
2012), http://www.propublica.org/article/details-emerge-on-government-study-of-presidential-par-
dons.  A contract to conduct this study has been awarded to the Rand Corporation. Detailed Infor-
mation for Award 2012-MU-CX-K045, U.S. DEP’T. JUSTICE., http://grants.ojp.usdoj.gov:85/
selector/awardDetail?awardNumber=2012-MU-CX-K045&fiscalYear=2012&applicationNum-
ber=2012-30210-CA-BJ&programOffice=BJS&po=BJS (last visited Feb. 19, 2013).
47. See Dafna Linzer, Congressional Leader Calls for Investigation of the Pardon Office,
PROPUBLICA (May 23, 2012), http://www.propublica.org/article/congressional-leader-calls-for-in-
vestigation-of-the-pardon-office.
48. See OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., OVERSIGHT AND REVIEW DIV., A REVIEW OF THE
PARDON ATTORNEY’S RECONSIDERATION OF CLARENCE AARON’S PETITION FOR CLEMENCY 21
(Dec. 2012) (“[Pardon Attorney Ronald] Rodgers did not represent [the United States Attorney’s]
position accurately, and his conduct fell substantially short of the high standards to be expected of
Department of Justice employees and of the duty that he owed to the President of the United
States.”).
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Justice Department’s “prosecutorial mindset” had “undermined the process
with huge backlogs and delays.”49 Meanwhile, by the end of his first term
in office President Obama had issued even fewer pardons than his two pred-
ecessors,50 perhaps hoping to avoid scandal by making only token use of his
power. Reports from inside the Obama Administration suggested that only a
fraction of the favorable recommendations received from the Justice De-
partment had been acted on favorably, with many left pending or returned
for a different recommendation, seeming to confirm President Obama’s
lack of confidence in the pardon process.
The disintegration of the federal pardon process, which began in ear-
nest in the Clinton Administration and has continued to the present, can be
traced to three fateful decisions. The first was Franklin Roosevelt’s deci-
sion, in 1933, to have the Justice Department stop publishing the reasons
for its favorable clemency recommendations.51 This decision deprived the
public of the factual predicate necessary to hold pardon decision-makers
accountable; reinforced the impression that pardoning was mysterious, ca-
pricious, and possibly corrupt; and encouraged the president in thinking that
he did not need to be accountable to the public for his pardoning.
The second decision came half a century later when Ronald Reagan
agreed to a delegation of responsibility for making pardon recommenda-
tions within the Justice Department from the attorney general to a career
civil servant who reported to officials responsible for overseeing the day-to-
49. See Editorial, The Quality of Mercy, Strained, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 5, 2013, http://www.
nytimes.com/2013/01/06/opinion/sunday/the-quality-of-mercy-strained.html?ref=opinion&_r=0:
Presumably, the president is willing to use acts of clemency to right the wrongs of the
sentencing and judicial systems. Yet the same cannot be said of the Justice Department,
which has a prosecutorial mind-set. It has undermined the process with huge backlogs
and delays, and sometimes views pardons as an affront to federal efforts to fight crime.
See also Samuel T. Morison, A no-pardon Justice Department, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 6, 2010, http://
articles.latimes.com/2010/nov/06/opinion/la-oew-morison-pardon-20101106 (“[T]he bureaucratic
managers of the Justice Department’s clemency program continue to churn out a steady stream of
almost uniformly negative advice, in a politically calculated attempt to restrain (rather than in-
form) the president’s exercise of discretion.”).
50. See Linzer, supra note 9 and accompanying text (“President Obama has granted clem-
ency at a lower rate than any modern president.”).
51. The practice of publishing reasons for pardon recommendations began in the first Cleve-
land Administration, and for almost half a century opened a fascinating window into the operation
of the post-Civil War federal justice system. Each year, between 1885 and 1932, the annual report
of the attorney general detailed (sometimes extensively) his reasons for recommending each of the
hundreds of annual clemency grants, providing an unparalleled basis for holding publicly account-
able an otherwise unrestrained power of government. But in 1933 this practice ceased, reportedly
at the direction of  President Roosevelt himself, and the Justice Department’s annual report on the
pardon program thereafter contained little more than opaque case processing statistics. See Love,
supra note 2, at 1191 (noting that for the twenty-five years after 1932, “published reports of the
pardon attorney contained only bare case statistics, and between 1941 and 1955 no reports were
published at all”). Between 1958 and 1963 the reports of the pardon attorney detailed policy
aspects of the pardon program, as well as President Kennedy’s decision to commute dozens of
mandatory minimum drug sentences, but thereafter the reports returned to being generally
uninformative.
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day work of federal prosecutors.52 This delegation deprived the president of
authoritative and accountable advice from a Senate-confirmed member of
his Cabinet, and marginalized the pardon program within the Justice
Department.
The third fateful decision was President Clinton’s unprecedented pub-
lic distancing from the Justice Department’s pardon process in several high
profile cases,53 which together with his long-running neglect of the routine
pardon caseload54 set the stage for the undisciplined orgy of pardoning on
the final day of his term.55 The loss of public confidence in the pardon
process that resulted from the blatant cronyism of Clinton’s final grants has
never been acknowledged or addressed. Then, as now, the pardon process
was seen to favor the wealthy and well-connected, and not ordinary people
with garden-variety cases. Then, as now, the Justice Department process
produced few favorable recommendations,56 gave undue advantage to ap-
plicants with influential advocates,57 and generally appeared to operate in a
random and unfair fashion.58 Over the past fifteen years the pardon process
has become so compromised in the public mind, and so unfriendly to any-
one outside the Justice Department, that the president himself no longer
relies on it.
Many doubt that the Justice Department process is capable of the kind
of reform necessary to restore what Supreme Court Justice Anthony Ken-
52. See 28 C.F.R. § 0 (1983). The 1982 revision of Part I of 28 C.F.R. formalized the attor-
ney general’s responsibility for making clemency recommendations to the president, but at the
same time it authorized the delegation of this responsibility within the Justice Department to a
career official who at the time did not even enjoy executive status.  That official’s recommenda-
tions were to be communicated to the White House through subordinate political appointees in the
Justice Department whose primary management responsibilities involved oversight of federal
prosecution policy and practice.
53. See, e.g., THE PARDON ATTORNEY REFORM AND INTEGRITY ACT, S. REP. NO. 106-231, at
8 (2000) (allowing for commutation of sixteen Puerto Rican terrorists without Justice Department
advice). See also Darryl W. Jackson et al., Bending toward Justice: The Posthumous Pardon of
Lieutenant Henry Ossian Flipper, 74 IND. L.J. 1251 (1999) (describing the pardon attorney’s
refusal to docket posthumous pardon application on behalf of first Black West Point graduate).
54. See Love, supra note 7, at 196 n.38 (2003) (describing irregular consideration of pardons
at the White House throughout the Clinton presidency).
55. See The Controversial Pardon of International Fugitive Marc Rich, supra note 36, at
342–43 (containing testimony of Beth Nolan, Counsel to former President Clinton, describing
unresponsive Justice Department pardon process at the conclusion of the Clinton Administration,
and the ensuing frantic effort at the White House in the final weeks to process the hundreds of
clemency requests coming directly to the White House). See also Love, supra note 7, at 191–97
(describing run-up to final Clinton pardons, the failure of the Justice Department pardon process,
staffing of pardons in the White House, and the grants themselves).
56. See Dafna Linzer, Obama Has Granted Clemency More Rarely Than Any Modern Presi-
dent, PROPUBLICA (Nov. 4, 2012), http://www.propublica.org/article/obama-has-granted-clem-
ency-more-rarely-than-any-modern-president.
57. See Linzer, supra note 44 (chronicling the pardon of Dale Critz Jr. whose pardon was
secured with the assistance of a congressman).
58. See, e.g., Gill, supra note 43, at 16 (juxtaposing the pardon of Scooter Libby with the
experience of a nonviolent drug offender serving a long prison sentence).
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nedy called its “moral force.”59 But whether or not the Justice Department
remains in its stewardship role, it is clear that major reforms are necessary
to restore the pardon process to something that protects and serves both the
president and the justice system. State pardon procedures discussed in the
following section suggest ways that the federal pardon process could regain
the transparency, authority, and accountability that are conducive to more
frequent and responsible use of the power. While the president could not
constitutionally be compelled to adopt such procedures, he could do so vol-
untarily, adapting elements of functional state systems to the federal
context.
II. WHAT THE PRESIDENT CAN LEARN FROM THE STATES ABOUT USING
HIS PARDON POWER
The constitutions of most states provide for regulation of the pardon
power at least to some extent. Even where the governor’s constitutional
power is unlimited, creative legislatures have found ways to introduce a
degree of accountability and transparency into the pardon process that is
foreign to the federal system. In some states no pardon may issue without a
public hearing, and in others pardon applications must be published in the
newspaper or tacked on the courthouse door. Frequently the governor is
happy to cede some of his power as a way of avoiding unwanted favor-
seekers and the controversy that frequently follows an irregular grant. Even
in those states where the constitution contemplates no legislative control
over the pardon process, the state constitution may require the governor to
report after the fact about the pardons he or she has granted, including the
reasons for each grant. This modest degree of legislative and popular over-
sight does not guarantee that the governor will grant many pardons, but it
does seem to ensure that the pardons that are granted will be defensible. It
seems noteworthy that none of the states in which pardon-related scandals
have recently engulfed the governor insist that the governor share the power
or report to the legislature.60
There are three basic administrative models that govern pardoning in
the United States. In six states, the governor plays almost no part in the
59. See Kennedy, supra note 8, at 128.
60. See, e.g., In re Hooker, 87 So. 3d 401, 414 (Miss. 2012) (upholding Mississippi Governor
Haley Barbour’s controversial final grants despite applicants’ failure to comply with constitutional
notice provisions); Doe v. Nelson, 680 N.W.2d 302, 313 (S.D. 2004) (unsealing pardons granted
by South Dakota Governor Bill Janklow that did not comply with statutory process). In 1991, the
departing Ohio governor, Richard F. Celeste, drew protests with clemency orders for a number of
individuals on death row, including a man who had raped and killed a seven-year-old girl. After
that, Ohio amended the state constitution to require the governor to obtain a nonbinding recom-
mendation from the parole board before making a clemency decision. William Glaberson, States’
Pardons Now Looked at in a Starker Light, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 16, 2001, http://www.nytimes.com/
2001/02/16/us/states-pardons-now-looked-at-in-starker-light.html (reporting on a number of par-
don controversies in states whose laws place few controls on the governor’s pardon power).
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pardon process, and the pardon power resides in a governor-appointed inde-
pendent board. In twenty-one states, the governor shares power with other
elected or appointed officials. In twenty-three states, the governor is author-
ized to pardon by law but is not required to consult with other officials
before doing so. The wide variety in pardoning policies and practices from
jurisdiction to jurisdiction makes it hard to generalize about the effective-
ness of any particular administrative model, though some generally tend to
produce more pardon grants and fewer pardon-related controversies than
others. Based on the frequency of pardon grants over time and the regularity
of the pardon process, it would appear that the jurisdictions in which pardon
plays the most functional role are those in which the decision-making au-
thority is exercised by or shared with other executive officials.61
A. Independent Board Model
In six states, the governor has little or no role in pardoning, and the
pardon power is exercised by a governor-appointed board that is also re-
sponsible for prison releases.62 These independent pardoning boards are
heavily regulated in terms of their procedures and conduct most of their
business in public. The boards in Alabama, Connecticut, Idaho, South Caro-
lina, and Utah are each required by statute to hold a full public hearing
before granting a pardon and to notify concerned state officials and victims
beforehand to enable them to attend the hearing and state their reasons for
or against the pardon on the record. The Georgia board reviews all cases on
a paper record, issues a written opinion in each case, and is required to
report annually to the legislature, the attorney general, and the governor.
The Alabama board is required to report annually to the governor.
The twin requirements of transparency and accountability enforced on
all of these six independent boards are conducive to issuing numerous par-
dons at regular intervals (although the fact that the pardon process involves
no elected officials is at least equally important to their effective operation).
Each year more than 400 pardons are granted by the boards in Alabama,
Connecticut, and Georgia, and 200 pardons are granted each year in South
Carolina, with an approval rate that ranges in these states from 30% to 60%
of all applications received. While the Idaho board grants only thirty to
forty pardons each year, this represents more than half of all applications
filed, and grants are issued at regular intervals. These boards accept applica-
61. Specific constitutional or statutory sources of authority for the statements made in this
section can be found in the chart appended to this article, reprinted from Love, supra note 11. See
also the state-specific profiles at id.
62. See ALA. CONST. amend. 38 (amending art. V § 124); GA. CONST. art. IV, § 2, para. II;
IDAHO CONST. art. IV, § 7; S.C. CONST. art. IV, § 14; UTAH CONST. art. VII, § 12; CONN. GEN.
STAT. § 54-124a(f) (2010). In Alabama and South Carolina, the governor retains clemency power
in capital cases; in Idaho, pardons of some serious offenses must be approved by the governor.
The pardon procedures that apply in each of these states are detailed in the state-specific profiles
at Love, supra note 11.
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tions as soon as a person’s sentence is completed or after a brief additional
eligibility period, and most of their business comes from people seeking to
avoid employment bars or firearms disabilities. None takes more than a
year to process a typical pardon request.
B. Shared Power Model
In twenty-one of the forty-four states where the governor exercises
most or all of the pardon power, the governor’s power is limited, either by
specific constraints spelled out in the state constitution or by statutory con-
ditions enacted pursuant to specific constitutional authority to regulate the
practice of pardoning.63 In some of these states, the constitution itself pro-
vides for a sharing of the power to pardon, sometimes with other elected or
appointed officials and sometimes with an administrative board that is also
responsible for prison releases. In every one of these “shared power” states,
there is a degree of transparency and accountability that seems to encourage
responsible (if not reliably generous) pardoning.
There are three basic variations on the “shared power” model. In four
states, a pardon may not be granted except with the consent of other high
officials sitting with the governor as a board of pardon.64 In nine states, the
governor may not grant a pardon without an affirmative recommendation
from a body of elected or appointed officials.65 In Rhode Island, the gover-
nor may not pardon except with the advice and consent of the state legisla-
ture.66 In six states, the governor is required to seek an advisory
recommendation from an appointed administrative board before a pardon
may issue, though the board’s advice is not binding.67 California’s system is
a hybrid that places constraints on the governor only if the person seeking
clemency has more than one conviction, in which case the governor must
obtain a recommendation from the parole board and approval from a major-
ity of the justices of the state supreme court.68
Most of the administrative boards that have constitutional status in this
“shared power” model are required by law to hold public hearings at which
the prosecutor and victim are allowed to speak, and to make public their
63. A summary of the states that have implemented the “shared power” model can be found
in the chart in the Appendix. See Love, supra note 11.
64. See FLA. CONST. art. IV, § 8(a); MINN. CONST. art. V, § 7; NEB. CONST. art. IV, § 13;
NEV. CONST. art. 5, § 14. For further details, see Love, supra note 11.
65. ARIZ. CONST. art. V, § 5; DEL. CONST. art. VII, § 1; LA. CONST. art. IV, § 5(E)(1); MASS.
CONST. pt. 2, ch. II, sec. I, art. VIII; MONT. CONST. art. VI, § 12; N.H. CONST. pt. 2, art. 52; OKLA.
CONST. art. VI, § 10; PA. CONST. art. IV, § 9(a); TEX. CONST. art. 4, § 11(b). For further details
see Love, supra note 11.
66. R.I. CONST. art. IX, § 13.
67. ALASKA CONST. art. III, § 21; ARK. CONST. art. 6, § 18; MICH. CONST. art. 5, § 14; MO.
CONST. art. IV, § 7; OHIO CONST. art. III, § 11; KAN. STAT. ANN. § 22-3701(4) (2012). For further
details on each of these state specific profiles see Love, supra note 11.
68. CAL. CONST. art. V, § 8; CAL. PENAL CODE 4803 (2012).
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recommendations to the governor. Most of these boards clearly set forth the
standards they expect a successful pardon applicant to meet. Some of the
“shared power” states impose additional transparency and accountability
constraints on the governor over and above those that apply to the adminis-
trative board, such as a requirement of advance public notice of an intention
to grant a pardon. The governor is required under the constitution in a ma-
jority of these “shared power” states to make regular periodic reports to the
legislature about the pardons he or she has issued, including the reasons for
each grant.
Sharing the power with other officials or an administrative board does
not guarantee gubernatorial enthusiasm for pardoning, and the experience of
the twenty-one states in the “shared power” model is much more mixed
than the “independent board” model. Within each of the three basic varia-
tions on the shared power model, there are some states where pardoning is
regular and generous, and some where it is infrequent or rare. For example,
of the four states that follow the “governor-on-the-board” model, two pro-
duce quite a few pardons (Nevada and Nebraska) and two do not (Florida
and Minnesota). The “governor-on-the-board” model has resulted in partic-
ular mischief in Florida, a state where felony offenders cannot even regain
the right to vote unless they are personally approved through a complex
clemency procedure that usually involves a public hearing before the gover-
nor and three of his cabinet appointees.69 Of the nine “gatekeeper board”
states, three (Delaware, Pennsylvania, and Oklahoma) produce a regular
stream of pardon grants, while pardons in the other six states in this group
are infrequent (Texas, Montana, and Louisiana) or vanishingly rare (Ari-
zona, Massachusetts, and New Hampshire).70 There has not been a pardon
in Rhode Island for many years, which is hardly surprising considering its
requirement of legislative advice and consent. Of the six states where the
constitution requires the governor to consult with an administrative board,
only Ohio and Arkansas have a lively tradition of pardoning.
It is hard to draw any general conclusions about why pardoning thrives
in some of these “shared power” states and is either ineffectual or moribund
in others. It may be that in some states, there is strong cultural as well as
institutional support for pardoning, and few alternative relief mechanisms.
This could explain why the governors of Oklahoma and Arkansas have con-
tinued to pardon generously while just slightly to the north, the governors of
Kansas and Missouri have not.71 Custom and expectation could explain
why pardoning thrives in Delaware and Nebraska while there has not been a
pardon in Arizona and Rhode Island in years.72 These factors could also
69. See FLA. CONST. art. IV, § 8; FLA. STAT. §§ 940.01, 940.05 (2012) (stating that the gov-
ernor may restore civil rights of a convicted felon if that person has met certain requirements).
70. For a summary of the frequency of pardoning in all 50 states see Love, supra note 11.
71. See Love, supra note 11.
72. Id.
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explain why progressive governors in Minnesota and Massachusetts appear
uninterested in pardoning while conservative governors in Nevada and
Pennsylvania continue to approve dozens of grants each year.73 Pardoning
is simply a fact of life in some states, a part of the routine housekeeping
business of government as opposed to a perk of office or an alien presence
in the justice system. Finally, the influence of personal inclinations and po-
litical ambition cannot be discounted, even in states where the governor
shares power with a board, which may account for the waxing and waning
fortunes of the pardon power in Ohio and Florida. There are numerous vari-
ables—for example, a recent politically costly mistake by a predecessor74—
that may disincline a governor to pardon even in states where institutional
arrangements seem to expect it. The one thing that seems fairly clear and
constant in the otherwise decidedly mixed experience of these “shared
power” states is that even if institutional support does not guarantee vigor-
ous pardoning, it seems to forestall irresponsible pardoning—unless of
course a failure to pardon at all, in the face of compelling circumstances,
can be so characterized.
C. Optional Consultation Model
In twenty-three states, the constitution imposes no prior restrictions on
the governor’s pardon power, though some constitutions permit a degree of
legislative regulation of the “manner of applying,”75 and some require the
governor to report to the legislature about pardons granted after the fact.76
73. Id.
74. See, e.g., Adam Liptak, To More Inmates, Life Term Means Dying Behind Bars, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 2, 2005, http://www.nytimes.com/2005/10/02/national/02life.web.html?pagewanted=
all&_r=0 (describing the 1992 release of convicted murderer Reginald McFadden on recommen-
dation of the Pennsylvania Board of Pardons as “the reason lifers no longer get pardons in
Pennsylvania”).
75. See, e.g., COLO. CONST. art. IV, § 7 (governor pardons “subject to such regulation as may
be prescribed by law relative to the manner of applying”); ILL. CONST. art. V, § 12 (same); ME.
CONST. art. V, pt. 1, § 11 (same); MO. CONST. art. IV, § 7 (same); N.Y. CONST. art. IV, § 4
(same); N.C. CONST. art. III, § 5(6) (same); WYO. CONST. art. 4, § 5 (same). Some state constitu-
tions give the legislature a broader authority to regulate the pardon power. See, e.g., IND. CONST.
art. 5, § 17 (governor may pardon “subject to such regulations as may be provided by law”); IOWA
CONST. art. IV, § 16 (same); KAN. CONST. art. I, § 7 (same); N.M. CONST. art. V, § 6 (same);
WASH. CONST. art. III, § 9 (same).
76. See, e.g., CAL. CONST. art. V, § 8 (governor must report to legislature each pardon, stat-
ing the facts of the case and giving reasons for grant); COLO. CONST. art. IV, § 7 (governor must
report to legislature “a transcript of the petition, all proceedings, and the reasons for his action”);
IND. CONST. art. 5, § 17 (governor must report to legislature at next scheduled meeting); IOWA
CONST. art. IV, § 16 (governor must report to the legislature every two years on pardons issued
and the reasons therefor); KY. CONST. § 77 (governor must file with legislature a statement of
reasons with each pardon grant, which must be available to the public); MD. CONST. art. II, § 20
(governor must report to the legislature each grant and reasons therefor); N.Y. CONST. art. IV, § 4
(governor must report annually on the particulars of each grant but not his reasons for granting
them); VA. CONST. art. V, § 12 (governor must report annually to the legislature setting forth “the
particulars of every case” of pardon granted, with reasons); WIS. CONST. art. V, § 6 (governor
must communicate annually with legislature each case of clemency and the reasons); WYO.
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In eighteen of these states, the legislature has attempted to impose a degree
of discipline on the pardon process by authorizing an administrative agency
to investigate pardon applicants, hold public hearings, notify concerned of-
ficials and victims, and make public recommendations to the governor.77
While the governor is not constitutionally required to avail himself of the
assistance offered, in most cases he does. The Tennessee Constitution does
not give the state legislature power to regulate the governor’s pardon
power, but it has asserted this power nonetheless, requiring the governor to
keep a record of the reasons for each clemency grant and to “submit the
same to the general assembly when requested.”78 In California, the courts
are the first stop for residents seeking pardon, with the parole board consti-
tuting a second level review process.79
In almost every one of these “optional consultation” states, there is
some provision for informing the public about who has applied for a par-
don, either before or after the governor acts.  Some states impose this notice
obligation on pardon applicants themselves, requiring them to publish their
applications in a newspaper and notify concerned officials and victims.80 In
this fashion, legislatures impose a degree of transparency and accountability
on the pardon process even where the constitution does not. While courts
have resisted arguments that these legislative restrictions are anything more
CONST. art. 4, § 5 (governor must report every two years to legislature on pardons granted, with
the reasons for each one); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:167-3.1 (2012) (governor must report annually to
the legislature the particulars of each grant, with the reasons); TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-27-107
(2012) (governor must report to the legislature the reasons for each clemency grant “when re-
quested”); W. VA. CODE § 5-1-16 (2012) (governor required to report the particulars of every
clemency grant to the legislature, with reasons for the grant). The states whose governors are not
required to report to the legislature are Hawaii, Illinois, Mississippi, New Mexico, North Carolina,
North Dakota, Oregon, South Dakota, and Vermont.
77. Of the states in this group, Illinois, Indiana, South Dakota, and Washington are required
by law to hold public hearings on all pardon cases they intend to recommend to the governor and
to invite participation by the district attorney and victim. See 730 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/3-3-
13(b) (West 2012); IND. CODE § 11-9-2-2(b) (2012); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 24-14-3 (2012);
WASH. REV. CODE § 9.94A.885(3) (2012).
78. TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 40-27-101, 40-27-107 (2012). The governor is also required to
notify the attorney general and relevant district attorney before any grant of executive clemency is
made public, and they in turn are required to notify the victim. Id. § 40-27-110. The Tennessee
parole board conducts a review of every case. TENN. COMP. R. & REGS. § 1100-01-01-.16(1)(b)2,
(c)1 (2012).
79. The California pardon process is unique in involving the courts in the pardon process. It
begins with a recommendation from the court in the county of an individual’s residence. It then
proceeds to the parole board which reviews the case and makes a second recommendation to the
governor. See CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 4852.06, 4852.19 (2012). Most of the pardons granted by
Governor Jerry Brown to California residents in 2011–2012 were first considered by the Califor-
nia courts, with those residing out of state filing their applications directly with the parole board.
See Margaret Colgate Love, Op-Ed., Governor’s Pardon Power Used Too Rarely, S.F. CHRON.
Dec. 28, 2012, http://www.sfgate.com/opinion/openforum/article/Governor-s-pardon-power-used-
too-rarely-4153130.php#page-1.
80. See, e.g., WIS. STAT. §§ 304.09, 304.10 (2012) (applicant required to publish notice of
application in county paper, or posted on courthouse door, deliver it to district attorney, judge, and
victim).
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than simply an effort to be helpful to the governor, they do appear to en-
courage governors to exercise their power responsibly.
Governors in these “optional consultation” states appear to have con-
cluded that they are on politically firmer ground, and are likely to be more
efficient in exercising their pardon power, if they rely voluntarily upon ex-
perienced professionals even where they are not required to do so. Thus, for
example, all of the 825 pardons granted by Governor Pat Quinn of Illinois
between April 2009 and November 2012 were recommended to him by the
Prisoner Review Board after hearing from each applicant at one of its regu-
lar quarterly hearings. The governor of Iowa issues several dozen pardons
annually, pursuant to recommendations he receives from his parole board,
and the governors of Indiana and Washington consider granting a pardon
only after a public hearing process that enables anyone who has a view
about a case to express it. Almost all of the 144 grants issued by California
Governor Jerry Brown in his first two years in office were first considered
by the California courts and parole board.81
There is good reason to abide by the process established by law since
governors who issue pardons without doing so frequently find themselves
in political hot water over ill-advised grants. For example, Governor Haley
Barbour of Mississippi was pilloried in the press and by crime victims after
he bypassed the regularly established review process in many of the par-
dons granted at the conclusion of his term, or else disregarded the advice he
got pursuant to that process.82
The South Dakota legislature has been particularly creative in manag-
ing the governor’s pardon power since its constitutional role in the pardon
process was eliminated in 1972. The forced deregulation of the pardon
power in South Dakota meant that pardon applicants could petition the gov-
ernor directly without going through the Board of Pardons and Paroles and
that the governor was no longer required to report his pardons to the legisla-
ture. Undaunted by this executive power grab, the South Dakota legislature
proceeded to replicate the constitutional transparency and accountability
safeguards lost in 1972 in a new statute.83 Thus, in addition to petitioning
the governor directly, people interested in obtaining a pardon may file a
petition with the Board of Pardons and Paroles seeking its favorable recom-
mendation; publish their petition in a newspaper of general circulation in
the county where the crime was committed once a week for three weeks;84
and come before the Board for a public hearing in which the district attor-
81. See Love, supra note 79 and accompanying text.
82. See In re Hooker, 87 So. 3d 401, 403 (Miss. 2012) (noting that the Mississippi Attorney
General filed a civil action alleging that Governor Barbour’s pardons during his last days in office
violated the state constitution).
83. See S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ch. 24-14 (2012).
84. Id. § 24-14-4.
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ney, sentencing judge,85 and victim may all participate.86 The legislature
cleverly made this alternative statutory route to obtaining a pardon more
appealing to petitioners by authorizing courts to seal the record of convic-
tion and the pardon itself.87 Equally clever, it divided responsibility for ap-
pointing the nine-member Board between the governor, the attorney
general, and the state supreme court, thereby avoiding any suggestion of
undue gubernatorial influence over Board recommendations.88 The South
Dakota Supreme Court confirmed in 2004 that sealing is available only for
pardons vetted through this public process,89 and since then the governors
of South Dakota have refused to grant a pardon except upon the Board’s
recommendation. The public pardon process turns out to be a very efficient
one: between sixty and seventy people apply for a pardon each year, the
Board recommends more than half of them to the governor, and the gover-
nor customarily accepts the Board’s recommendations. The entire process
takes less than six months from beginning to end.
With the exception of South Dakota, however, the pardon power in the
“optional consultation” states has, for the most part, ceased to play a relia-
bly vital role in the justice system, primarily because it depends so heavily
upon the personal predilections of the incumbent governor. Thus, for exam-
ple, the immediate past governors of Maryland, Michigan, Virginia, and
Wisconsin were enthusiastic about using their pardon power, but the incum-
bents have been parsimonious in the extreme.90 Conversely, the current
governors of Illinois and California have revitalized pardoning in their
states after decades of neglect and abuse.91
While the sort of institutional support for pardoning represented by the
“shared power” model does not guarantee a regular stream of pardon grants,
it is far more likely to lead to productive pardoning than the personality-
driven “consultation” model. Because “shared power” systems generally
tend to function with greater transparency and accountability, they inspire
public confidence and avoid the kind of scandal that has paralyzed the par-
85. Id. § 24-14-3.
86. Id. § 24-14-4.1.
87. Id. § 24-14-11.
88. Id. § 24-13-1.
89. See Doe v. Nelson, 680 N.W.2d 302, 313 (S.D. 2004) (holding that the governor had no
authority to order the sealing of 279 pardons granted between 1995 and 2002 without consultation
with the board). The history of the pardon power in South Dakota, including the involvement of
the legislature, is reviewed in Eric R. Johnson, Doe v. Nelson: The Wrongful Assumption of Gu-
bernatorial Plenary Authority Over the Pardoning Process, 50 S.D. L. REV. 156 (2005).
90. See Love, supra note 11.
91. See Chris Wetterich, Gov. Quinn Makes Dent in Clemency Backlog, ST. J.-REG., July 7,
2012, http://www.sj-r.com/top-stories/x537697530/Quinn-makes-dent-in-clemency-backlog (Gov-
ernor Quinn spent his first three years in office dealing with a 2,500-case backlog of recommenda-
tions from the state parole board); Love, supra note 79 (California Governor Jerry Brown pardons
144 in two years, reviving pardon process abused and neglected by his three predecessors); see
also Love, supra note 11 (Illinois and California profiles).
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don power in jurisdictions where the power is subject to fewer constraints.
The bottom line is that while constraints on the exercise of the pardon
power do not guarantee its responsible and constructive use, they certainly
seem conducive to that end.
III. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR REFORMING THE FEDERAL
PARDON PROCESS
State pardoning procedures suggest ways in which the federal pardon
process could be restored to its former healthy state so as to make it easier
for the president to use his power in a constructive manner. The three char-
acteristics that are keys to this restoration are:
• Authority: The process must be administered by individuals
who are independent and authoritative, who have the confi-
dence of the president, and who are given the necessary re-
sources to carry out the president’s pardoning agenda.
• Accountability: The process must be accessible and respon-
sive to people of all walks of life, and account for the likeli-
hood that many deserving pardon applicants will not have
skilled counsel or well-connected supporters to advocate on
their behalf.
• Transparency: The process must be guided by clear standards
that are applied consistently, producing grants that are publicly
defensible.
A. Authority
A degree of authority must be restored to the federal pardon process,
whether or not it remains housed in the Justice Department. This benefits
both the institution of the presidency and the justice system, as well as those
who seek and deserve the forgiveness. The delegation of responsibility for
making pardon recommendations during the Reagan Administration to a
subordinate career civil servant in the Justice Department went hand-in-
hand with a devaluation of pardon as a tool of justice, and produced a pros-
ecutor-controlled pardon process that neither serves nor protects the presi-
dent. That decision should be reversed.
The president must be able to rely on a process that serves his interests
above all, one that functions independent of other actors in a justice system
in which it is expected to play an integral role. The person or persons re-
sponsible for administering such a system must have the confidence of the
president, and the necessary resources to carry out the president’s pardoning
agenda. For example,
One simple and immediate way for the president to reinvigorate
the pardons process is to choose a person of stature and energy—
say, a federal judge—to steward his administration’s pardon du-
ties. At the same time, he can end the department’s conflict of
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interest by replacing the pardons office with a new bipartisan
commission under the White House’s aegis, giving it ample re-
sources and real independence.92
Ideally, making pardon recommendations should remain a responsibil-
ity of the attorney general, underscoring the relationship of pardon to the
justice system on the one hand and to the political process on the other.
But it is essential that control of the process be removed from the dead
hand of federal prosecutors who have come to view pardon as “an affront to
federal efforts to fight crime.”93 Establishing a panel of distinguished citi-
zens to advise on pardon policy and make recommendations in particular
cases would be one way to do this.94 Giving the courts responsibility for
making pardon recommendations, as they do in California, would be an-
other.95 The first could be accomplished by unilateral presidential action,
though the second would require congressional action.
B. Accountability
The president should publicly announce a pardoning policy and stan-
dards for considering particular cases, and commit himself to abide by the
recommendations of the attorney general. If those recommendations are
made public once a grant has been made, whether for or against pardon, a
degree of accountability will have been restored to the process.
In addition, the pardon process must at least appear to operate fairly
and regularly in order to command the kind of public confidence necessary
to enable the president to pardon confidently. It cannot be seen to favor the
wealthy, the famous, or the well-connected. It must be made accessible and
responsive to all who apply, taking into account the likelihood that many
deserving applicants will not have skilled counsel or well-connected sup-
porters to advocate on their behalf.
Those responsible for administering the process should welcome appli-
cants, and not penalize them for failing to make a full and polished presen-
tation on their own behalf, or subject them to an investigative process that is
burdensome and unwelcoming. While it is perfectly reasonable to inquire
into a pardon applicant’s background, to ensure that the president has all the
information he needs to make a decision to bestow the sort of mark of favor
represented by a pardon, it is not reasonable or fair to disadvantage appli-
92. The Quality of Mercy, Strained, supra note 49.
93. Id.; see also Morison, supra note 21.
94. See Rachel E. Barkow, The Politics of Forgiveness: Reconceptualizing Clemency, 21
FED. SENT’G REP. 153, 157 (2009) (stating that administrative clemency boards can “take the heat
for decisions that turn out badly”); Kobil, supra note 14, at 622–23 (urging the president to “look
for advice from either a body of professionals charged with the sole task of reviewing clemency
requests, or to a group of volunteers appointed because of their expertise”). A catalogue of past
uses of specialized clemency panels to handle large-scale amnesties in the federal system can be
found at Love, supra note 2, at 1173–74 n.16.
95. See Love, supra note 79 and accompanying text.
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cants without education and resources by subjecting them to extensive in-
quiries even before the customary FBI investigation has been authorized.
As to prisoner petitions, the federal courts should permit federal de-
fenders to represent their former clients in clemency proceedings. In recent
years it has been possible to evade and manipulate the federal pardon pro-
cess precisely because the process was not an open one that gave a fair
hearing to all. It would be sensible to restore efficiency to the process so
that applicants did not have to wait years for a decision. It would also be
sensible to apply a presumption in favor of pardon in cases where the appli-
cant had a record of law-abiding conduct and a sensible reason for seeking a
pardon.
C. Transparency
The standards that now guide the Justice Department in deciding
whether to recommend that the president grant a pardon or commute a sen-
tence are set forth on the pardon attorney’s website, and are generally clear
and unexceptionable. Circumstances that might warrant sentence commuta-
tions are: “disparity or undue severity of sentence, critical illness or old age,
and meritorious service rendered to the government by the petitioner.”96
The inquiry for those seeking post-sentence pardon will look at post-con-
viction conduct, character, and reputation; seriousness and relative recent-
ness of the offense; acceptance of responsibility, remorse, and atonement;
need for relief; and official recommendations and reports.97
While these criteria appear reasonable enough on paper, in practice
their very subjectivity invites abuse. Because the process itself is not open
for public inspection, the only way to monitor how the criteria are applied
in practice is to study its results. Until recently, the only results that were
publicly available were cases in which a pardon was granted. However, the
names of those denied pardon are now also available through the Freedom
of Information Act.98 An investigation conducted by ProPublica compared
cases in which pardon was granted with cases in which pardon was denied
during the administration of George W. Bush, and concluded that the pub-
lished criteria were not applied consistently to cases with similar
characteristics.99
The key to restoring a degree of transparency in the pardon process is
for the Justice Department to return to the practice, abandoned in FDR’s
96. Standards for Considering Pardon Petitions, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, § 1-2.113 (Sept.
1997), http://www.justice.gov/usao/eousa/foia_reading_room/usam/title1/2mdoj.htm#1-2.110.
97. Id. § 1-2.112.
98. See Lardner v. Dep’t of Justice, 638 F. Supp. 2d 14 (D.D.C. 2009), aff’d 398 F. App’x
609 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (Justice Department obliged to release existing lists of the names of persons
who have been denied executive clemency by the President to anyone who requests such records
pursuant to the Freedom of Information Act).
99. See Linzer & LaFleur, supra note 39.
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Administration, of publishing an annual report explaining the president’s
pardon policy and practice, and setting forth the reasons for each grant.
While publication of pardon applications and public hearings would also go
some way to establishing the necessary transparency, they would also bur-
den applicants and discourage pardons in controversial cases. Defending a
grant after the fact best balances considerations of efficiency with the need
to ensure that subjective standards are being applied fairly. The requirement
in many state constitutions of providing an annual report to the legislature
on pardon grants, including the reasons for each one, could be transposed
into the federal process to considerable advantage.
It is true that the president could not be compelled to adopt any of
these reforms, short of an amendment to the Constitution. But there is no
reason why the president should not impose a degree of discipline on the
way he uses his power, even if the other branches of government could not
require him to do so. Congress might encourage the president to issue
grants through a regular accountable process (as the South Dakota legisla-
ture has encouraged the governor) by offering a premium legal effect for a
pardon obtained through a more functional process (perhaps a vacatur of the
conviction record). It might also create a process by which the federal
courts could funnel meritorious cases to the president, accompanied by a
recommendation for pardon, like the “certificate of rehabilitation” process
that constitutes the first step in California’s pardon process.
CONCLUSION
There is not a single state where the governor is as completely un-
restricted and unprotected in pardoning as the president. There is not a sin-
gle state whose pardon process is as poorly conceived and managed as the
federal government’s, which has failed to evolve with the changing needs
of the presidency and the justice system over the past one hundred years.
The Justice Department’s program is hard to understand and even harder to
penetrate, operating in secret and accountable to no one. Three successive
presidents have been willing to live with this dysfunction, perhaps because
they did not regard pardoning as a duty of office, and perhaps because they
perceived its risks to far outweigh its rewards. But inaction as a strategy has
proved to have risks of its own, as both Presidents Clinton and Bush could
attest. Without a plan for using the power, and without a reliable system for
carrying it out, pardoning will remain a dangerous activity for the president,
and Hamilton’s “benign prerogative” consigned to a useless vestigial
appendage.
State pardon systems suggest ways that federal pardoning could regain
its moral force and be reinvigorated, through the articulation of a purposeful
pardoning philosophy and a strategy for putting it into practice, including:
clear standards, a transparent investigative process, the participation of rep-
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utable advisors, and disclosure of the reasons for particular grants. While
the president could not constitutionally be compelled to adopt such provi-
sions, he could do so voluntarily by adapting elements of functional state
systems to the federal context. In the end, it is important to restore “moral
force” to the pardon process for the institution of the presidency, the presi-
dent’s personal reputation, and the integrity of the justice system itself.
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